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Since 2016, we have been collaborating to understand how 
people make sense of and respond to privacy risks of new 
technologies. We focus our evaluations on mobile technolo-
gies because they are both ubiquitous and raise unique pri-
vacy challenges. Smartphones, wearables, and Internet of 
things (IoT) technologies are designed to make people’s 
lives easier, more efficient, and healthier. To do this, they 
collect a wide range of data, including location and move-
ment data, health and fitness data, and social media content. 
Data typically flow constantly from our devices to outside 
parties, and most consumers have little understanding of 
what data are being shared, who gains access to that data, 
and what they use that data for.
When considering surveillance and monitoring in 
response to COVID-19, we recognize that, in times of crisis, 
the norms around acceptable data flows may shift. At the 
same time, there is a risk that temporary measures estab-
lished during a crisis become permanent and unnecessarily 
reduce citizens’ privacy, which was the case in the United 
States following the September 11 terrorist attack. For a 
public health crisis like COVID-19, proposed solutions to 
minimize the spread of the virus include a number of poten-
tially invasive forms of data collection.
In this essay, we examine how contact tracing apps are 
being developed and rolled out. We identify privacy concerns 
about apps being framed as solutions to reduce the risk of 
COVID-19 and enable the reopening of communities and 
businesses. Using Nissenbaum’s (2010) framework of pri-
vacy as contextual integrity (CI), we argue that the appropri-
ateness of sharing data with third parties to support public 
health will be contextually dependent. Furthermore, deciding 
when to violate information norms that determine appropriate 
information flow of health data should also be governed by 
prevailing social and political values. If we ignore this second 
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Abstract
The global coronavirus pandemic has raised important questions regarding how to balance public health concerns with 
privacy protections for individual citizens. In this essay, we evaluate contact tracing apps, which have been offered as a 
technological solution to minimize the spread of COVID-19. We argue that apps such as those built on Google and Apple’s 
“exposure notification system” should be evaluated in terms of the contextual integrity of information flows; in other words, 
the appropriateness of sharing health and location data will be contextually dependent on factors such as who will have 
access to data, as well as the transmission principles underlying data transfer. We also consider the role of prevailing social 
and political values in this assessment, including the large-scale social benefits that can be obtained through such information 
sharing. However, caution should be taken in violating contextual integrity, even in the case of a pandemic, because it risks a 
long-term loss of autonomy and growing function creep for surveillance and monitoring technologies.
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point, we risk a long-term loss of autonomy and growing 
function creep across a wide range of technologies.
Contact Tracing and Privacy Concerns
Contact tracing refers to the practice of mapping out who an 
infected person has been in contact with to minimize disease 
spread. It has been used in prior disease outbreaks, including 
Ebola in 2014 (Webb et al., 2015) and the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic (Adler & Johnson, 1988). Contact tracing involves 
three steps: (1) identifying people who had been in contact 
with an infected person, (2) locating and notifying contacts 
about their exposure, and (3) regularly following up with con-
tacts to monitor for infection (World Health Organization, 
2017). Contact tracing has traditionally been conducted using 
large staffs of workers to canvas neighborhoods on foot; how-
ever, newer technologies should make this process faster and 
more efficient.
In the weeks following the declaration of COVID-19 as a 
pandemic by the World Health Organization, several compa-
nies and countries have unveiled plans for smartphone-based 
contact tracing apps. Most notably, Google and Apple—who 
control the two most popular smartphone operating systems—
announced a collaboration to develop tools to fight the virus 
(Romm et al., 2020). Their “exposure notification system” 
API uses Bluetooth (rather than more precise location data) to 
identify other smartphones that come into proximity with the 
phone of an infected person, then notify them through the app. 
Similar solutions using Bluetooth are being used in other 
countries, including the United Kingdom (Harkness, 2020), as 
well as Singapore and Australia (Abbas & Michael, 2020).
Google/Apple’s proposed tool has been largely received 
with support from privacy scholars regarding the steps being 
taken to ensure data privacy and security (Whittaker, 2020). 
That said, there are a number of challenges to balancing citi-
zen privacy with public health benefits. First, while Bluetooth 
is a more privacy-preserving choice, it is also less useful at 
detecting potential virus exposure. False positives may be 
very common, depending on factors like whether a phone is 
in someone’s pocket or whether people are outside versus 
inside (O’Neill, 2020). Beyond that, as many as 2 billion older 
mobile phones will not be able to use contact tracing apps, 
and those left out include some of the most vulnerable popu-
lations (Bradshaw, 2020).
The biggest privacy concern with contact tracing, how-
ever, is the appropriateness of data flows from users’ 
smartphones: who can access data, how long is data 
stored, and for what purposes could that data be used in 
the future. Numerous groups have pointed to the wide-
spread surveillance policies enacted in the United States 
following the September 11 terrorist attacks as a caution-
ary tale for the normalization of mass surveillance, and 
have argued for careful assessments of current surveil-
lance tools to protect citizens’ civil liberties (e.g., Díaz, 
2020; Friedersdorf, 2020).
Ensuring Appropriate Data Flows in 
Contact Tracing
The theory of CI (Nissenbaum, 2004, 2010) rejects the tradi-
tional dichotomy of public versus private information, as 
well as the notion that privacy preferences and decisions in 
one setting universally apply to other settings. Instead, CI 
rests on the understanding that our interactions—with other 
people, institutions, and technologies—occur in particular 
contexts, and norms of appropriateness govern people’s 
expectations of how personal information should flow within 
a given context.
We have seen this in our research on people’s privacy atti-
tudes regarding their personal fitness trackers (Zimmer et al., 
2020). Our interviewees—recruited from a random sample 
of staff at two American public universities—had distinct 
privacy expectations for different types of data generated by 
their Fitbit, seeing data like steps as more acceptable for the 
device to collect and share than more personal identifiers. 
Furthermore, while our interviewees were comfortable with 
data being shared with Fitbit or their health provider, they 
felt sharing data with employers or insurance companies was 
inappropriate.
These expectations about information flows fit with the 
CI framework, which requires the assessment of four key 
parameters that shape norms of appropriateness: context, 
actor, attributes, and transmission principles. Context is the 
backdrop that informs which set of norms govern an interac-
tion. Doctor–patient conversations often occur in a health 
context while supervisor–employee conversations occur in a 
workplace context. Actor refers to the parties involved in a 
given interaction. Using our above example, Fitbit sends 
data about an individual’s step count and heart rate to various 
recipients, including the user and company servers. Attributes 
are the different types of information in play. Fitbits collect 
several attributes, including steps, heart rate, and sleep data. 
Finally, transmission principles shape or constrain the flow 
of information. The principle of confidentiality surrounds 
doctor–patient conversations, and the principle of consent 
often applies to a company’s use of an individual’s data.
When a new technology or practice affects these parame-
ters in a way that shifts informational norms, CI may be vio-
lated, pointing to a potential privacy violation. Thinking 
about privacy through the lens of CI forces us to reject sim-
plistic arguments like “since you’re sharing health informa-
tion with some, you’re okay with sharing it with anyone.” 
Rather, if one’s personal fitness data were suddenly shared 
with their employer, the change in actor violates the CI of the 
appropriate information flow. Similarly, a sudden change in 
the terms of service might disrupt the transmission princi-
ples previously in place. Or, if a software update now allows 
the inference of sexual activity based on your fitness metrics, 
that change in attributes means previous appropriateness of 
information flows from the device to one’s social network 
might now be disrupted. CI, then, provides us a much more 
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nuanced insight into the appropriateness of changes to per-
sonal information flows.
So, what does this mean in terms of privacy concerns with 
contact tracing and COVID-19? CI helps us explain the strong 
negative reaction to initial media reports of governments 
seeking to track people’s locations via their smartphones 
(Newton, 2020; Tau, 2020). While individuals are comfort-
able sharing their location with Google or Garmin to receive 
services like navigation and fitness tracking, having that data 
flow to government officials for long-term monitoring of citi-
zen movements—a change in actor and transmission princi-
ples—was deemed an inappropriate new information flow.
CI also explains why the solution proposed by Google/
Apple has been largely considered acceptable. By relying on 
Bluetooth to track physical proximity between phones, the 
system does not collect or store any locational data, nor does 
it send data to centralized databases. Google/Apple have 
resisted pressure from governments who want access to app 
data to build a picture of population movements in aggregate. 
Thus, Google/Apple have created transmission principles 
aligned with users’ expectations, limited the attributes of data 
being used to trace contacts, and restricted actors who get 
access to such information. In all, their solution maintains the 
CI of appropriate information flows, even when faced with 
the pressures of managing a public health crisis.
Protecting Broader Moral and Political 
Values
Even with CI being preserved through Google/Apple’s 
approach, nagging concerns remain about the broader pri-
vacy and surveillance implications of embracing any plat-
form intended to monitor people’s movements and health 
status. As Díaz (2020) wrote for the Brennan Center:
The impulse to turn to high-tech tools in this time of crisis is 
understandable—and some such tools might indeed be a useful 
part of our response to Covid-19. At the same time, history 
offers ample reason to proceed with caution.
Díaz notes how many post-9/11 surveillance programs are 
still active today, nearly two decades after the crisis that jus-
tified their creation. Faced with a history of technology pro-
viders and governments alike misusing personal information, 
extending data collection beyond what was initially autho-
rized or envisioned, and engaging in “function creep”—
when a technology deployed for benign purposes slowly gets 
repurposed for problematic ends—it is reasonable to be con-
cerned that we are opening pandora’s box by embracing any 
smartphone-based contact tracing solution.
CI helps us work through these broader concerns about 
future data misuse. Our assessment of the key parameters 
shaping norms of appropriate information flows is only the 
starting point for determining whether CI may be disrupted 
by new technology. This initial analysis provides us a prima 
facie judgment as to whether a new process significantly vio-
lates the entrenched norms within the context.
Nissenbaum (2010) also argues that CI demands a wider 
examination of the moral and political implications of new 
information flows to make a more complete assessment as to 
whether technology should be allowed or resisted. In her 
words, to properly apply CI, we must
consider moral and political factors affected by the practice in 
question. What might be the harms, the threats to autonomy and 
freedom? What might be the effects on power structures, 
implications for justice, fairness, equality, social hierarchy, 
democracy, and so on? (p. 182)
Clearly, we are attempting to protect public health amid a 
global pandemic, and we are balancing that goal against indi-
vidual privacy. Our prima facie assessment of the Google/
Apple solution suggests sufficient privacy protections are in 
place. But there are also broader moral and political values at 
play when thinking about appropriate data flows, including 
individual autonomy and freedom from surveillance. We must 
ask, What are the prevailing values, goals, and ends within the 
context of using smartphones for contact tracing? CI pushes us 
to weigh these values when making the final determination of 
whether the Google/Apple contact tracing is acceptable.
Google/Apple have taken careful steps to protect individ-
ual privacy; our fear, however, is that despite their best 
efforts, embracing such forms of widespread surveillance to 
address the pandemic might be used to justify wider escala-
tions of health monitoring that impinge on individual auton-
omy. Not all tracing apps will be as privacy-protecting as the 
Google/Apple solution, and other technologies might collect 
more detailed health data, track more specific locational 
data, or rely on face recognition to identify and monitor 
infected citizens. Using CI, we must look beyond near-term 
privacy-preserving steps taken by Google/Apple, and seri-
ously reflect on possible future impacts on broader moral and 
political values as these technologies proliferate.
We encourage technology developers and policymakers 
to embrace a set of principles to ensure CI is maintained to 
the fullest extent. These include implementing use limita-
tions to avoid function creep, having strong data minimiza-
tion and destruction policies, and ensuring full transparency 
and accountability. Such policies, at a minimum, must be in 
place to ensure that any contact tracing app will accord with 
protecting the broader set of moral and political values that 
CI compels us to protect.
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